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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20010124-CA

v.
MARK FIXMER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.

REPL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State's Brief of Appellant,
the State submits the following in reply to the arguments contained in defendant's
responsive brief.
AT THIS PRELIMINARY STAGE, DRAWING ALL REASONABLE
INFERENCES IN THE STATE'S FAVOR, THERE IS ABUNDANT
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED
THE METH LAB EQUIPMENT, STOLEN PROPERTY, AND DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE
COMMON AREAS OF HIS HOME AND GARAGE
In Point 1(B) of his responsive brief, defendant sets out the bindover standard and
recognizes that in State v. Clark, 2002 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300, the Utah Supreme Court
"analogized the preliminary hearing standard to the arrest warrant probable cause
standard[.]" Aplt. Br. at 9. However, the bulk of defendant's brief effectively disregards
the lenient Clark standard and its further requirement that all inferences be drawn in the

State's favor. Aple. Br. at 9-17. Despite evidence that meth lab equipment, drug
paraphernalia and stolen property were stored throughout the common areas of his home
and garage, defendant claims "[t]he State presented no evidence that [defendant]
knowingly or intelligently possessed laboratory equipment," and that "there was no lab
equipment in the home." Aple. Br. at 13, 15. Defendant's misapplication of the bindover
standard presents no compelling ground for affirming the magistrate's refusal to bindover
on charges that defendant constructively possessed the meth lab equipment, stolen
property, and paraphernalia distributed throughout his home and garage.
Bindover standard. At this preliminary stage, "the prosecution must present
evidence sufficient for the magistrate to find [p]robable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." State v. Talbot,
972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Magistrates must "view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
resolve all inferences in the favor of the prosecution." Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, "[u]nless the evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Id.
As previously mentioned, the Utah Supreme Court equates the bindover and arrest
warrant standards, recognizing that there is no "principled basis for attempting to
maintain a distinction between the arrest warrant probable cause standard and the
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preliminary heanng probable cause standard. . . Therefore, at both the arrest warrant and
preliminary hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed
it." Clark at f 16. Moreover, "this evidence need not be capable of supporting a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at <f 15.
Defendant's Appellate Claim. Defendant suggests that none of the lab
equipment, weapons, and paraphernalia found in his home and garage (see R99-101, 145146), were illicit because no precursor chemicals were found inside his home, but instead
were located only on the stolen ATVs stored in his garage up until the night of his arrest
(see, e.g., R95-97, 106). See Aple. Br. at 13 ("There were no precursor chemicals or
methamphetamine found in the home"). Even if the items seizedfromhis home and
garage did amount to meth lab equipment, supplies and drug paraphernalia, defendant
claims that his roommate (codefendant Guertzgen) had a closer relationship to
codefendants Hoppe, Kelson and McLaughlin, who retrieved the meth-lab laden ATVs
that night, and thus his roommate had a closer connection to the illicit items in his
(defendant's) home and garage as well. See Aple. Br. at 14. At this preliminary stage,
however, defendant's theories are irrelevant—the only relevant question is whether the
State's theory, that he constructively possessed the meth lab equipment, drug
paraphernalia, and stolen ATVs found in the common areas of his home and garage, is a
reasonable one. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20.
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Defendant's heavy reliance on constructive possession cases like State v. Fox, 709
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), fails to establish that the State's theory is unreasonable. First, Fox
and most of the other cases cited in defendant's brief deal with the State's
higher—beyond a reasonable doubt—burden of proof at trial. See Aple. Br. at 10-11, 1316 (citing Fox and similar cases). As emphasized by defendant, Fox recognizes that
"[ojwnership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which [] drugs are found, although
important factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially
when occupancy is not exclusive." Id. (citations omitted). While ownership and nonexclusive occupancy may be insufficient in themselves to establish constructive
possession beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, they do support a "reasonable belief that
an offense has been committed by defendant for purposes of bindover. Clark, 2001 UT 9,
f 16. Moreover, the State's case is presumed only to strengthen by the time of trial. Id. at
f 10. Finally, there is no indication in Fox that the acquitted Fox brother/defendant
should not even have been bound over for trial.1

1

Brothers Gary and Clive Fox each lived in the home/marijuana farm, owned by
Gary. Id. at 318. Attached to the home, and accessible only through the kitchen, was an
opaque greenhouse containing marijuana plants. Id. Each brother had a separate
bedroom. Id. In Gary's bedroom police found his personal effects and a book entitled
Marijuana Grower's Guide and drug paraphernalia. Id. In Clive's room police found
only his personal effects and no indication of drug activity. Id. On appeal, the supreme
court upheld home-owner Gary's conviction because his "non-exclusive possession and
control combined with other incriminating evidence" sufficed to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319-320. The supreme court reversed Clive's
conviction for possession with intent to distribute, on the other hand, because Clive's
simply knowing about the marijuana farm was itself insufficient to establish that he "had
4

Defendant cites one case dealing with the sufficiency of evidence to bind over on a
charge of constructive possession, State v. Reed, 2000 UT App 258 (unpublished). Reed,
however, is distinguishable both factually and legally, and thus similarly fails to render
the State's constructive possession theory in this case unreasonable. Reed lived for only
three weeks in the house in which police found chemical precursors and laboratory
equipment. 2000 UT App 258, *1. Additionally, "[t]he room containing the meth lab
was rented to someone other than [Reed], and there was no evidence indicating that
[Reed] had any control over the room or its contents." Id. Finally, no chemical precursors
or lab equipment were found with Reed's belongings, nor had he made any incriminating
statements. This Court thus determined that the State "did not 'produce enough evidence
sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict with respect to each element of the
crime," and therefore the trial court properly quashed the bindover. Id.
Thus, Reed is factually distinguishable. Here, in contrast to Reed, defendant had
lived in his home much longer than three weeks, and the illicit items were not limited to
one or both defendants' bedrooms, but were strewn throughout the common areas of
defendant's home and garage {see, e.g., R55, 70,99-101,107,145-146). Moreover, there
is no indication that defendant's roommate had any greater dominion and control over the
items than defendant: defendant told police that codefendant Hoppe obtained permission

the power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the marijuana." Id. at 320.
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from him, not codefendant Guertzgen, to store the ATVs and "camping equipment" in the
garage (R66, 177). While Hoppe told defendant not to ride the ATVs, defendant further
admitted that he had done so (R178).
Moreover, Reed predates Clark, and thus applies the erroneous directed verdict
standard, rather than the clarified arrest warrant standard in reviewing the preliminary
evidence. Clark, 2001 UT 9, UK 15-16 ("[U]nlike a motion for directed verdict, [the
preliminary evidence need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt"). Thus, the result in Reed may well have been different under the
controlling and more lenient Clark standard.
In sum, the possibilities are limited. Either defendant or his roommate, or both,
constructively possessed the illicit items found in the common areas of defendant's home
and garage, and either or both of them arranged to store the stolen meth lab laden ATVs
in defendant's garage. Where, as here, "the facts give rise to two alternative inferences,"
one of which would support probable cause, nothing more is required. Clark, 2001 UT 9,
f 20. The State's theory of culpability is a reasonable one; therefore, the magistrate
clearly ignored the bindover standard in refusing to draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the prosecution theory that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed
the meth lab equipment and supplies, drug paraphernalia and stolen ATVs found in the
common areas of his home and garage.

6

CONCLUSION
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over and dismissing the felony
information should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding
defendant over for trial on charges of possession of meth lab equipment and supplies,
receiving stolen property, and possession of drug.paraphernalia.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 2 . Jul y 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v
Jeff Claude REED, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 990973-CA.
Sept. 8, 2000.
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Before BENCH, DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ

MEMORANDUM DECISION
BENCH.
*1 The State argues that because actual involvement in
a clandestine lab is not an element of the offense
charged, it was not required to establish an actual
physical connection between defendant and the lab
located in his residence Although we agree that
showing a physical connection between defendant and
an operating laboratory is not required, the statute does
require the State to establish that defendant, intending
to "engage in a clandestine laboratory operation,"
actually possessed the controlled substance precursor,
or laboratory equipment, or supplies. Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37d-4(l)(a) & (b) (1998) (providmg it is unlawful
to knowingly or intentionally "possess" such items
"with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation"). Further, in order to prove constructive
possession, "it is necessary that 'there [be] a sufficient
nexus between the accused and the drug [or
paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion
and control over the drug [or paraphernalia]'" State v
Layman, 1999 UT 79,113, 985 P 2d 911 (alterations in
original) (quoting State v Fox, 709 P 2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985)) In determining whether there is
constructive possession, we may "consider[ ] factors
Copr © West 2002 No <

that were considered relevant by an appellate court
analyzing a factually-similar context." Id at % 5
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant
lived m the house for approximately three weeks before
the controlled substance precursors and laboratory
equipment were found. Alone, this is not enough to
establish constructive possession. See Fox. 709 P 2d at
319 (stating "[ojwnership and/or occupancy of the
premises upon which the drugs are found, although
important factors, are not alone sufficient to establish
constructive possession, especially when occupancy is
not exclusive"). The room containing the laboratory
was rented to someone other than defendant, and there
was no evidence indicating that defendant had any
control over the room or its contents See id (providing
one factor of constructive possession may be "presence
of drugs m a specific area over which the accused had
control"). No controlled substance precursors or
laboratory equipment were found among defendant's
personal effects, see id (providmg another factor of
constructive possession may be "presence of drug
paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or
in a place over which the accused has special control"),
and defendant made no incriminating statements
connecting him to the laboratory found in the house
See id Simply put, the evidence does not" 'permit an
inference that [defendant] had both the power and the
intent to exercise dominion and control' " over the
contraband found m the downstairs bedroom. Layman,
1 9 9 9 U T 7 9 a t f 13 (quoting Fox. 709 P 2d at 319)
Therefore, because the State did not "produce enough
evidence sufficient to survive a motion for a directed
verdict with respect to each element of the crime," the
trial court properly quashed the bindover State v
Talbot, 972 P 2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)
*2 Accordingly, we affirm.

DAVIS and THORNE, Judges, concur
2000 WL 33249879 (Utah App.), 2000 UT App 258
END OF DOCUMENT
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